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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this brief is not to argue further
the points covere·d in arguments I through V in ap:pel.lant's brief', but ratper to answer respondents' arguments advanced in support of their three cross-assignments of error. These cross-assignments have reference
to the admission in evidence by the court of conversaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2

tions with the deceased Cathrine Jensen, both "shortly"
after and "long" after the sale to the respondents, and
to t;he, court's refusal to strike some of S'aid conversations. Appellant's answer to said cross-assignments is
herein propounded under one proposition as follows:

. THE UNSWORN DECLARATIONS OF THE
DECEASED CATHRINE JENSEN, BOTH "SHORTLY" AFTER AND "LONG'' AFTER THE TIME O·F
S.ALE WERE ADMISSIBLE AS EJTHER DIRECT
OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF AN INDEPENDENTLY RELATIVE FACT, TO-WIT, HER
INTENT OR STATE OF MIND, AN EX·CEP'TION
TO THE HEAR.SAY RULE.
Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 7 of· their complaint,
as amended at the trial; the following (R. 2) :
7. That plaintiffs have information which
· they believe and therefore .allege as a fact that
- -defendant [referring to Cathrine Jensen] in signing Exhibits ''A'' and '' B '' did so in the belief
and with the understanding that she was selling
to p~laintiffs the property described in Paragraph
3 hereof and that she later discovered the mistake
that had been made, which discovery was made
on or about November 24, 1947.
In answer thereto defendant denied the allegation and
alleged affirmatively as ~ollow~ (R. 11):
4. That never at any time did defendant
[referring to Cathrine Jensen] sell, contract to
sell, either orally or by writing, or intend to sell
Parcel 2 to plaintiffs.
which allegation- was denied in plaintiffs' reply.
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These pleadings plainly raise as an issue Cathrine
Jensen's intent or state of mind at the time she negotiated 'vith the plaintiffs' agent and entered into the
earnest n1oney agreement and also at the time she signed
the uniform real ·estate contract. Under the exception
to the hearsay rule that uns,vorn declarations concerning independently relative and probative facts are admissible, the conversations had by defendant and defendant's 'vitnesses with the deceased Cathrine Jensen
were properly admitted.
The statements made by Cathrine Jensen to the
effect that she wanted Mr. Biddinger, her former husband, to build a small two-room house to live in or a
little lunchstand on the 25¥2 foot piece, that S'he thought
he was a good cook; that his daughter could help hin1
and that it was plenty large for a little five-cent place
and that it would be nice since there were tourist cabins
around, as testified to by the defendant, Mrs. Harper
(R. 152-153), her sister, Mrs. Freeman (R. 172), Mr.
Biddinger ( R. 179-180) and }\ifr. J. C. Jensen· ( R. 185),
were all offered and admitted not for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements, that is,
that the 25¥2 foot tract is large enough for a two room
house or lunchstand, or that Mrs. Freeman was a good
cook, etc., but rather for the purpose of establishing the.
fact that Mrs. Cathrine Jensen's state of mind or intent
at the time she made those statements was that she
presently owned and had not sold the 25¥2 foot tract,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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which in turn is competent circumstantial evidence of
the fact that at the time of entering into the agreement
in controversy she had no intent to include the 25~2
foot tract in the sale. The testimony of Verda Wheeler
at T. 165 and T~. 1'66 concerning the declarations o~ her
mother, Cathrin~ Jensen, the day of the sale, likewise
was not offered for the purpose of proving that the
Sines were not buying all of the property, that Cathrine
Jensen didn't buy the 25lf2 foot piece with the rest of
the place ·and that that w·as her reason for not selling it
with the place, or that she wanted to put a hamburger
stand some place on it, etc., but rather for the purpose
of directly establishing Cathrine Jensen's intent and
state of ·mind with reference to what was included in
the sale at the time of the transaction.
Corpus Juris Secundum carries the following discussion of this exception to the hearsay rule in Volume
31, page 1007, as follows:
''Sec. 256- Intent and Intention. Declarations may be relevant evidence as to the existence
o~ a particular intent or intention in the mind of
the declarant. Such declarations are admissible
if, and not unless, the existence of the particular
m·ental state ·at the time to which the declarations
relate is a relevant fact; and are to be excluded
where the intent does not affect the legal result
of the transaction. The declarations are not direct
evidence of the facts asserted, but merely circumstantial evidence as to the existence of some
relevant and material fact. Such evidence is admissible,· not as a part of the res gestae, but as
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a fact relevant to a fact in issue, although, as
hereinafter pointed out in Section 403, a statenlent forming' a part of the res gestae may also
be admissible to disclose intent or intention."
and continuing at page 1009 of 31 C. J. S.:

''Time of declaration.. A declaration of, intent or intention is not necessarily admissible·
because made contemporaneously with relevant
acts; existence of the particular mental state at
that time ~ust itself be a relevant fact. On the
. othe~ hand, no requirement exists that the making of a declaration indicating intent or intention
should be contemporaneous with th·e time ·when·
its existence is relevant,_ but th,e test is logic
rather than time, and, within limits prescribed by
the rules as to remoteness, prior or subsequent,
as well ~s accompanying, statements are competent..
''Death of declarant. An otherwise, relevant
declaration is not rendered incompetent by reason ·
of the fact that the declarant is dead. It has also
·been declared that such a declaration, to be admissible, must appear to have been made in a
natural manner, and not under circumstances of
suspicion.
''Declarations favorable to declarant. If a
declaration of intent or intention is relevant, the
declarant is entitled to the benefit of it, even
though it be in his favor.''
These principles are supported by many other text
writers, such as Jones, Commentaries on Evidence,. Sec4, Section 1729 ;
tion 1088 ; Wigmore, 3rd Edition, Vol.
I
Chamberlayne, The Modern Law of Evidence, Vol 4,
'
page 3~619 et seq.; and 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Section
162c and d.
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As examples o~ this doctrine there have been a few
Utah cases concerning the question of intent of an
alleged donor at the time of delivery. In the case of
Mow~r v. Mower (1924) 64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911, the
trial court excluded evidence of extrajudicial declarations of a decedent to the effect that he had made deeds
and ·put them in his box so that his wives could get them
upon his death, etc., upon the ground the declarations
were self-serving and hearsay. This court holding that
the declarations were admissible inasmuch as they had
a bearing on the question of intent to deliver the deeds,
quoted part of the above quotation from Corpus Juris,
:and said further:
''In line with the abov<e quotations and· authorities, we remark that in this case the proffered testimony was not offered to. prove the
truth of the declarations that his wife upon his.
death could go and get the deeds, or that it was
the best way to keep his house in order, or that
he had deeded a part of his land away and it
would be necessary for him to change his deeds
to make it ~equal, or the truth of the statements
· made in his application to the Forest D·epartment, but was offered as additional circumstances,
along with all the other acts and conduct and surrounding circumstances, to determine whether or
not there was a delivery of the ·deeds in question.
We conclude that the offered evidence should
have been received and that its rejection was
error."
This case has been cited as ,.good law and followed in
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2d 465 (1939),
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Schultz v. Y·oung, 37 N.~l. 4~7, 24 Pac. 2d 276; and Cren- ·
sha'v v. Crensha,v, (1948) 68 Ida. 470, 199 Pac. 2d 264.
Shnilar declarations as evidence concerning the question of delivery 'vere held :admissible in Troseth v. Troseth (1947) 224 Minn. 35, 28 N. W. 2d 65.
This principle is also applied in cases of fraud, to
show both bad faith of the defendant and scienter of the
plaintiff. See Bigelow on Fraud, Vol. 1, Ch·apter X,
_Section 7. Unsworn declarations of a victim prior to a
homicide to the effect that he was going over to the
defendant's house were held ·admissible in State v. Mortensen (1903), 26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562 as proof of his
intention or design, as circumstantial evidence that he
was there at the time of the killing. In Parry v. Harris
(1937), 93 Utah 317, 72 Pac. 2d 1044, the court was concerned with the issue of damages in a breach of promisd
suit, and held that evidence of plaintiffs unsworn declarations to third p~ersons to the effect that she was embarrassed to go out among people bec~use they would
talk about her ·as "the girl who was supposed to marry
Harry Bransford'' was admissible as proof of her mortification, ·although not admissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements. And in Wetmore v.
Mell, 1 Ohio St. Rep. 26, in a suit for breach of promise,
plaintiffs unsworn statement to her sister as well as her
conduct in preparing her trousseau were held 'admissible
for the purp~ose of proving her acceptance of the offer
of marriage. The court in Burrell Engineering and Construction Co. v. Grisier (1922), 111 Tex. 447, 240 S. ·vv.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

899, held that :a statement by ·an employee to the defendant's superintendent that machinery was defective, was
admissible, not to show the truth of the fact that the
machine was defective, but to show that the superintendent was put on notice of the likelihood of a defect, and
therefore . negligent in not having it repaired.
The above examples, particularly the Utah cases
dealing with the question of intention to deliver, serve
to show the applicability of the above exception to the
hearsay rule in instances. such as the principal case
where the intention or state of mind of a person at a
·particular time is a material issue to be dete!mined. It
is therefore submitted that the evidence of Cathrine
Jensen's statements in the conversations with her daughters, Mr. Biddinger and Mr. Jensen, had at a time before
any claim of mutual mistake was made, were properly
admitted :as showing her state of mind or knowledge of
what ~she included in _the sale at the time of the transaction with Mr. Dowell. The appellant respectfully
urges this court to consider this evidence, as it may do
in equity actions, together with all of the other compe_.
tent ·evidence, records and files in this case, to reverse .
the. lower court and to direct that judgment denying
reformation be entered in favor of the defendant, and
for whatever other relief to the court seems equitable.
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